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CHINA AND THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH: SELECTIVE ADAPTATION AND 
TREATY COMPLIANCE† 
Pitman B. Potter 
University of British Columbia 
I. Introduction 
The international community has devoted considerable energy to dialogue and exchanges with 
China on issues of treaty compliance in areas of trade and human rights. While many 
improvements are evident in China’s legal regimes for trade and human rights, problems 
remain—particularly in the areas of Party leadership, institutional performance, and conceptual 
orientation. In trade policy areas of national treatment, subsidies, and dumping and transparency, 
China’s performance remains conflicted. Leaving aside delicate questions of political freedoms 
and civil liberties, China’s human rights record on basic questions of human wellbeing in areas 
of labour standards, environmental quality, and health care invites continued critical scrutiny. 
Yet academic and policy discourses on China’s trade and human rights policy and practice are all 
too often conflicted by normative differences, and illusions about them, which often undermine 
engagement and obscure analysis. Claims about universality of trade and human rights principles 
conflict with assertions that China’s cultural particularity warrants special exceptions from 
international rule regimes, or at least requires interpretations of these standards that allow 
flexible application in China. The paradigm of “selective adaptation” (Potter 2004) offers a 
potential solution to this dilemma, by examining compliance with international trade and human 
rights treaties by reference to the interplay between normative systems associated with 
international rule regimes and local socio-cultural norms that affect treaty interpretation and 
application. After examining the concept of selective adaptation in the context of trade and 
human rights generally, this paper will focus particularly on China’s policies and practices in the 
human right to health. 
† Contribution to “China’s Human Rights Performance: Treaty Compliance in Light of Selective Adaptation and 
Institutional Capacity” prepared for United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), October 30, 
2006. 
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II. Selective Adaptation: Legal Culture and Treaty Compliance in Trade and Human 
Rights 
Selective adaptation involves a dynamic by which international rule regimes are mediated by 
local socio-cultural norms. Proceeding from typologies linking international rule regimes with 
associated sets of normative principles, and informed by concepts linking rule compliance with 
the existence of normative consensus, the paradigm of “selective adaptation” suggests that treaty 
compliance may require intermediation with local norms. Compliance with treaty rules involves 
a myriad range of interpretation and application, which in turn involve the intervention of 
interpretive communities comprised of political, legal and socio-economic elites (Fish 1980). In 
the trade area, for example, we have found that the international rule regime is grounded in 
liberal norms of popular sovereignty and limits on state agency (Biukovic 2004). In the health 
area, we have found that the international rule regime is grounded in norms about the links 
between health and social wellbeing, the importance of health in realizing values of human 
dignity, and shared social interests in prevention, monitoring, and treatment of infectious disease 
(Biddulph 2004). Selective adaptation analysis would examine the extent to which these norms 
are shared by interpretive communities in treaty member states. 
While the interplay between rule acceptance and normative assimilation is at the heart of the 
selective adaptation process, the process depends on additional factors, including perception, 
complementarity, and legitimacy (Potter 2004).  
- Perception influences understanding by interpretive communities concerning both 
non-local rule regimes and local socio-cultural norms. Perception may involve 
relatively simple elements of translation and distribution of the content of 
international rules, to more complex factors of cognition, ranging from 
misunderstanding to cognitive dissonance. Thus, selective adaptation of international 
trade rules on transparency raises questions about publication of trade rules that range 
from translation to cognitive understandings of notions of “public.” Selective 
adaptation of international human rights standards on self-determination might raise 
perception issues around translation of the term “freely” as well as questions of 
understanding what that term requires in terms of institutional response.  
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- Complementarity describes a circumstance by which apparently contradictory 
phenomena can be combined in ways that preserve essential characteristics of each 
component and yet allow for them to operate together in a mutually reinforcing and 
effective manner. Complementarity may involve factors of institutional compatibility 
between, for example, public and private models for enforcement of human rights 
standards, or may extend to more complex issues of the normative ideals underlying 
these institutional arrangements. Thus, selective adaptation of international trade rules 
on transparency or human rights standards on self-determination may depend on the 
extent to which institutional remedies for correcting non-transparency are compatible 
with local processes.  
- Legitimacy concerns the extent to which members of local communities confer on the 
purposes and consequences of selective adaptation a sense and expectation of just-
ness. Legitimacy may involve factors ranging from personal preferences to broader 
social perspectives of idealism, nationalism, and ethnocentrism in the evaluation of 
procedural or substantive dimensions of international rule regimes. Thus, selective 
adaptation of international trade rules on transparency and human rights standards on 
self-determination may depend on the degree to which social actors conclude that the 
content of these standards and the processes for achieving them are just.  
While much of the academic and policy work on treaty compliance focuses on rule enforcement, 
the rules themselves are subject to considerable variation in interpretation and application, which 
itself is driven by normative values. Accordingly, understanding treaty compliance requires more 
than simply comparing local performance with the text of international rules. Instead, treaty 
compliance may well involve local interpretation of treaty texts according to normative 
perspectives quite different from those than inform the treaty. Thus, treaty compliance can be 
understood more clearly by examining the extent to which norms underlying the international 
regime are consonant with local norms. This can help explain compliance outcomes, by 
differentiating between those situations where non-compliance is the result of normative conflict 
and those cases where local norms are consistent with the norms of the international regime but 
local practices fail to satisfy international standards. Such a norms-based approach invites 
expansive empirical research on the structure and content of local cultural norms, and the link 
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with acceptance of international rule regimes. The focus then shifts from state-centred discourses 
of compliance to socially grounded analysis of normative consensus. 
The discourse of “selective adaptation” is most assuredly not an exercise in justifying non-
compliance with international obligations by reference to government assertions about national 
and social interests or lack of institutional capacity. Rather, “selective adaptation” posits a model 
for understanding the reality that international trade rules and human rights standards will in 
practice be interpreted according to local norms, and the likelihood that enforcement of 
international rule regimes will depend on the extent of commonality between the norms 
underlying these rule regimes and local cultural norms. While “selective adaptation” offers the 
potential to understand legal culture dynamics of localization of international trade and human 
rights standards, it also limits efforts to justify non-compliance with treaty obligations. The key 
determinant in “selective adaptation” is the relationship between the norms underlying 
international trade and human rights standards and local socio-cultural norms—not as these are 
articulated by states, but rather as discerned empirically in society. Willful non-compliance 
driven by factors of political will and/or institutional capacity may thus be distinguished from 
non-uniform compliance that reflects the legitimate influence of normative diversity. In turn, 
remedies for non-compliance with international trade and human rights standards may vary 
depending on the normative relationship between international rule regimes and local societies. 
Demonstrated lack of normative consensus on the goals, processes, and outcomes associated 
with international treaty regimes may invite efforts to explore the potential for accommodation 
of normative difference and may support movement toward accepting normative diversity in the 
recognition and enforcement of trade and human rights standards. On the other hand, non-
compliance in the absence of normative conflict may invite performance remedies and possibly 
institutional incentives to induce stronger compliance.  
In sum, the focus on normative dynamics of compliance allows the paradigm of “selective 
adaptation” to limit the scope of claims to cultural relativism as an explanation for 
non-compliance with international trade and human rights standards. Where demonstrable 
conflicts exist between international rule regimes and local socio-cultural norms, accommodation 
to cultural differences might be useful. But non-compliance unrelated to factors of normative 
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consensus cannot be excused by reference to cultural relativism. Thus, “selective adaptation” 
suggests limits to cultural relativism in international trade and human rights discourse.  
III. Selective Adaptation Applied: Perspectives on China’s Human Rights Discourse and 
Practice  
China’s human rights discourse on human rights to subsistence and development, and China’s 
practices around the human right to health provide useful examples of “selective adaption.” 
China’s official policies on the right to subsistence and development reveal the power and 
resiliency of official norms of governance and their capacity to temper international standards on 
human rights. While this normative paradigm affects practices on the human right to health, 
selective adaptation analysis suggests that China’s shortcomings in meeting international 
standards are more the product of political will and institutional capacity than normative 
diversity  
A. The Right to Development: Human Rights in Light of Patrimonial Sovereignty 
China’s official discourses on human rights draw on official norms of the state as the source of 
rights and social welfare. China’s norms of governance reflect a paradigm of “patrimonial 
sovereignty” (Potter 2004), by which administrative agencies and regulators have responsibility 
for the wellbeing of society, but are not responsible (accountable) to society for their political 
authority. State officials are accountable primarily to their bureaucratic and political superiors, 
and as a result have few incentives to attend to the substantive needs of human wellbeing for the 
subjects of rule. This helps to set an ideological context by which protection of individual human 
rights is relegated to secondary status behind the primary status of the state.  
China’s human rights policies reflect these assumptions about the centrality of the state as the 
source of rights and as the determinant of the beneficiaries of rights. China’s 2004 Human Rights 
White Paper formally integrated themes of subsistence and development, drawing on the 
international discourse of the right to development to complement China’s ongoing emphasis on 
the right to subsistence. Yet continued emphasis is given to China’s particular circumstances as 
justification for a particularistic approach to balancing these rights with civil and political human 
rights under the theme “political development with Chinese characteristics.” (State Council 
Information Office 2005). The 2005 White Paper stresses the development of China’s socialist 
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legal system and emphasizes constitutional arrangements for enforcement of human rights. Yet 
these remain constrained by China’s constitutional system, which limits rights to those expressly 
granted by the Party/state, and qualifies the exercise of rights on upholding Party rule and 
protecting the interests of the state (Constitution 1982, Arts 1, 51). In contrast to natural rights 
theories that view rights as inalienable and intrinsic to the human condition, the PRC 
Constitution speaks of rights being granted by the state. Article 33 of the PRC Constitution goes 
yet farther, and conditions the extension of legal and civil rights on performance of the “duties 
prescribed by the Constitution and the law.”  
Under this approach, rights are not inherent to the human condition, but rather are specific 
benefits conferred and enforced at the discretion of the state. The state’s role as patrimonial 
sovereign entails not the recognition of fundamental rights of members of society but rather the 
conferring of rights on particular members of society subject to specific conditions. As indicated 
by the 2005 Human Rights White Paper, human rights remain generally subject to the needs of 
national development. Thus, China’s conditions are seen to require conditioning human rights on 
the pursuit of reform, development and stability. This has significant implications for securing 
human rights to health, as issues of access to health care; detection, reporting, treatment and 
monitoring of disease; and protection of systemic supports for human health come to be subject 
to broader state goals of national development.  
B. Administrative Law and Governance in China 
 
C. Health Care in China: Human Rights in Practice 
Questions about China’s compliance with international standards pertaining to human rights in 
health warrant particular attention, not only because of the global implications of China’s 
handling of health issues of SARS, HIV, Avian Flu, and Streptococcus, but because of the 
effects on the wellbeing of the Chinese people. China has committed itself to compliance with 
international human rights standards on the right to the “highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health” (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 12). 
Yet China’s performance has been conflicted by factors largely unrelated to the normative 
consensus underlying human rights to health.  
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China’s public health system has long been presented as a model for developing economies. 
While the “barefoot doctor” model of the Maoist period was heavily mythologized, the PRC did 
succeed in bringing basic levels of health care to an unprecedented number of Chinese people. 
However, the modernization policies of the 1980s and the attendant social and political 
consequences of income disparities, declining public budgets, and official corruption have 
eroded significantly the standards of public health care (Henderson 1990). The crises of HIV and 
SARS have revealed in stark detail the extent to which policies and practices on public health 
remain subject to imperatives of political expediency, and suggest that the fundamental human 
right to health remains compromised. Government efforts in areas of health education and the 
prevention, reporting, and treatment of disease involve individual members of society not only as 
passive recipients of the exercise of government authority but as active stewards of their own 
physical well-being. While the collaboration between public and private is essential to public health 
policy, this interdependence is obstructed by abuses such as government censorship and secrecy on 
public health conditions, and popular stigmatization of disease. China’s recent experience with HIV 
and SARS reflects the ways in which these factors affect human rights to health. 
China’s first reported case of HIV involved a foreign tourist visiting southeast China in 1985 
(Human Rights Watch 2003b). The intersection in Yunnan and neighboring provinces in China 
and Myanmar between drug trafficking, illegal migration, and sex tourism offers a rich array of 
vectors for disease, and provided government officials with ample justification for treating HIV 
initially as a foreign-related anomaly that could be managed through conventional approaches of 
quarantine and repression. However, twenty years later, HIV infection rates in Yunnan alone are 
reported as high as 80,000 and rising at a rate of 30% per year (Watts 2004). Nationally, China’s 
official figures estimate that 840,000 people are living with HIV while some 100,000 are 
reported to have died from the disease (Yardley 2004). The United Nations estimated that China 
could have as many as 10 million AIDS sufferers by 2010 (Koss 2004). 
The virtual explosion of HIV/AIDS cases in China reflects a combination of factors ranging from 
poverty in the midst of rapid economic development, corruption, government paternalism, and 
popular attitudes toward disease. Although the conventional perception that HIV/AIDS was 
introduced to China from abroad and was concentrated among intravenous drug users, 
prostitutes, and gay men remained prevalent and helped retard government action, the blood 
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donor crisis that emerged in Henan and other central provinces greatly expanded the reach of the 
disease (Brown 2004; Lim 2004; Park 2003; Human Rights Watch 2003b). While China’s cities 
and suburban areas (mostly but not exclusively along the eastern seacoast) have in the main 
profited from the rapid economic growth of the past few decades, interior provinces and rural 
areas have often been left out of the race to development. With prosperity has come the 
possibility of expanded and more sophisticated health care, including greater needs for blood 
plasma. Economic growth policies have also seen both decreases in government budgets, as the 
replacement of state enterprise remittances with tax receipts has been weakened by lax 
enforcement and by tax preference policies aimed at stimulating investment. While, as 
elsewhere, the poor have long been a favored source of blood donations, state regulation of blood 
collection work has become weaker and riddled with corruption, such that screening of donors 
became highly problematic especially in rural areas (Watts 2003). As a result, the transmission of 
HIV/AIDs through the blood system brought the disease into the mainstream of Chinese society. 
China has now officially acknowledged the importance of active measures to address the crisis of 
HIV/AIDS. No less a personage than Vice Prime Minister Wu Yi announced in May 2004 new 
“urgent measures” for prevention and education and to ensure proper reporting on outbreaks 
(Yardley 2004). While official attention from the highest levels of the government undoubtedly 
reflects the views of many that significant changes are needed in China’s policies and practices 
on HIV/AIDS, there is a sad echo of past pronouncements. In November 1998, the State Council 
issued a “strategic plan” for HIV/AIDS prevention and control (State Council 1998). That 
document stressed the extent of the government’s commitment to HIV/AIDS prevention and 
control, but also underscored the ideological role of Communist Party leadership in areas of 
spiritual civilization, suggesting an approach still rooted in notions of patrimonial sovereignty 
aimed at “behavioral change” rather than norms of responsible agency aimed at government 
accountability for protecting the public welfare. While the attention to education was welcomed 
by most observers, the document paid most attention to issues of surveillance, reporting and 
control—efforts which, bereft of public accountability, invited abuse and a general orientation 
toward concealment and suppression. Thus, academicians and health care professionals 
attempting to address the crisis complained repeatedly of concealment and repression from local 
officials (Yang 2000).  
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In 2001, in response to the scandal of the blood collection tragedy, China’s Ministry of Health 
announced an “action plan” for preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS (State Council 2001). While 
the plan acknowledged the potential role for social participation, the government retained 
“primary responsibility” for AIDS/HIV work, with particular attention to prevention and 
secondary attention to public education and treatment. The “action plan” included work 
objectives to close down illegal blood collection centres and to strengthen testing of blood 
supplies. The plan also reiterated the importance of the “socialist spiritual civilization” rhetoric 
of the 1998 strategic plan. While the “action plan” was notable for its candor in recognizing past 
deficiencies and in providing specific guidelines for treatment of sufferers, it also retained a 
general tenor emphasizing state-led surveillance and ideological guidance and thus remains 
dependent on the capacity of state institutions and regulation. Questions continue to arise over 
the institutional capacity for HIV/AIDS prevention, as well as the disturbing tendency to punish 
HIV/AIDS victims (U.S. Embassy 2001).  
The intrusion of ideology and local prejudice into public health process on HIV/AIDS was also 
reflected in the Central Committee and State Council’s 2002 decision on promoting rural health 
work (Central Committee and State Council 2002), whose repeated references to the “three 
represents” and the building of socialist modernization set the tone for the provisions. While the 
measures indicated a renewed commitment to rural health care, the localization of health 
treatment raised the possibility of further entrenching discriminatory attitudes about HIV/AIDS 
(Human Rights Watch 2003b). Suppression of information has also continued, supported by the 
text of the State Secrets Law (1988) and its Implementing Regulations (1996), which prohibit 
unauthorized dissemination of information on outbreaks of infectious disease. The arrest of the 
health official who had first broached the subject of the blood collection scandal in Henan was 
purportedly justified by reference to the State Secrets regime (Human Rights Watch 2003b). 
China’s regulations on reporting infectious disease (PRC Ministry of Health, 2003a), while 
mandating the responsibility of health care professionals to report on outbreaks, still reiterate the 
importance of internal state-sanctioned reporting processes. 
The orientation toward patrimonial sovereignty in the government’s handling of human rights to 
health was also evident in China’s handling of the SARS crisis of 2003. The deadly atypical 
pneumonia first emerged near Guangzhou in November 2002, apparently jumping the species 
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barrier to humans from civet cats, a local delicacy. In late January, the central government sent to 
Guangdong Province, where the virus apparently originated, a “top secret” document alerting 
local health authorities about the novel pneumonia-like disease spreading through the region 
(Pomfret 2003a). Despite this early knowledge, Beijing did not formally request assistance from 
the World Health Organization (WHO) until March 10, 2003 and began to provide information 
on the disease a week later. China permitted WHO researchers into Guangdong only in early 
April. This delay permitted SARS to migrate unchecked to Hong Kong in February and to other 
provinces of China. Canada’s own SARS crisis derived from a traveler from Hong Kong. On 
April 3, drawing on a State Council declaration the previous day, Minister of Health Zhang 
Wenkang announced confidently that the disease was under control. However, Dr. Yang 
Jiangyong of the Beijing No. 301 Military Hospital almost immediately sent e-mails to Chinese 
and Hong Kong television stations indicating that the actual number of SARS cases and deaths in 
Beijing was significantly higher than the figures admitted by the Minister of Health (Pomfret 
2003b). Clearly there were significant gaps in the government’s reporting on the SARS crisis. 
Following an extraordinary session of the PRC Politburo on April 17, Health Minister Zhang and 
Beijing Mayor Meng Xuenong were dismissed, although this seemed to suggest the beginning 
rather than the end of a top-level power struggle between President Hu Jintao and his ally 
Premier Wen Jiabao on the one hand, and hold-over political operatives loyal to Jiang Zemin 
(Pomfret 2003b; Lam 2003). 
China’s efforts to control SARS in major cities and particular the countryside faced continued 
uncertainty. Efforts at public reporting on the numbers of SARS cases (PRC Ministry of Health 
2003b), were compromised by questions about methodology and persistent rumours about the re-
routing of SARS patients out of municipal hospitals to ensure lower reported rates of infection. 
Orders issued May 7, 2003 from the Ministry of Health on SARS measures in rural areas 
highlighted the seriousness of the SARS epidemic. By identifying epidemic areas as including 
Guangdong, Beijing, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Hebei, the regulations acknowledged the 
wide-spread nature of the epidemic while still suggesting artificial limits on government 
attention in other locations. By calling for particular attention to monitoring migrant workers, the 
measures revealed the depth of the challenge to control this heretofore nearly uncontrollable 
vector of contagion.  
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While editorials in the authoritative People’s Daily in June and July 2003 (People’s Daily 2003a; 
People’s Daily 2003b) suggested a renewed commitment to greater openness in governance, the 
sustainability of this approach remains uncertain. Thus, Guangdong Governor Huang Huahua 
and 1st Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang were spared dismissal, despite their poor handling of the 
crisis, because of their links to Jiang Zemin. As well, the Ministry of Health backtracked on 
putative apologies for its handling of SARS and minimizing the whistle-blowing role of Dr. 
Yang Jiangyong (who was later placed under house arrest in mid-2004 for challenging another 
government orthodoxy, concerning the Tiananmen massacre).  
Aside from the question of elite-level political struggle, the SARS crisis revealed yet again the 
deeply entrenched effects of political and institutional arrangements aimed at preserving 
patrimonial sovereignty over responsible agency as norms of governance. As has often been the 
case with HIV/AIDS, doctors and other health care professionals were among the first to call for 
public action, only to be silenced by government bureaucrats. Health care workers bore the brunt 
of the disease, suffering up to 45% of cases in Guangdong for example. As with HIV/AIDS, 
China’s management of SARS was crippled by an information control system, supported by the 
PRC State Secrets Law and its various implementing and ancillary regulatory regimes, under 
which epidemics are considered state secrets. Although the 1989 Epidemic Control Law requires 
officials to report accurately on epidemics, this still keeps reporting and information within 
government control, with little if any accountability to the public. Politics also determined 
Beijing’s decision to block the WHO from helping Taiwan with its own SARS outbreak. The 
WHO meanwhile concluded that China was not cooperating adequately in on-going efforts to 
combat SARS (Crampton 2003).  
In light of selective adaptation analysis, China’s practices in the area of human rights seem 
unrelated to factors of cultural diversity, limiting the scope for cultural relativism as a defense to 
international human rights criticism. Public statements by the Chinese government, together with 
the results of preliminary interviews in China and Hong Kong suggest there is a basic normative 
consensus around the human right to health. Neither elite and government norms, nor local 
popular norms appear to conflict with norms associated with the international health regime. In 
the area of perception, statements by senior Chinese leaders and actions taken to rebuke and 
remove officials who failed to ensure prompt reporting of infectious disease suggest that 
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international standards on health were perceived accurately and accepted. While officials 
responsible for health law and policy engaged with conflicting local conditions—particularly 
institutional constraints on responses to health crises in HIV/AIDs and SARS—their perceptions 
about the applicability of international standards seemed consistent with international 
expectations. This suggests that there were few normative conflicts between Chinese and 
international rule regimes. Factors of complementarity did pose particularly difficult operational 
problems in areas of public access and information dissemination. However, this appeared to 
reflect tensions between governance norms and the socio-cultural norms of local communities, 
rather than conflict with the norms of the international rule regime. Complementarity between 
international and local patterns of institutional response to public health crises will remain a 
challenge, as China’s official legal culture themes of patrimonial sovereignty conflict with 
international human rights themes of responsible agency.  
The importance of legitimacy was evident throughout China’s health care crisis, as the 
Party/state was seen as failing to deliver on the promises to provide social wellbeing, that have 
served as a foundation for the regime’s political authority. Domestically, public confidence in 
government services in public health has been sorely tested, raising questions about the 
government’s commitment and capacity to protect public welfare more generally. China’s 
handling of the HIV/AIDS and SARS crises has undermined its search for international 
legitimacy as well, as the government seems unable to uphold its own commitments to protecting 
the Chinese people’s right to development.  
IV. Conclusion 
Developed as a tool for understanding trade and human rights treaty compliance generally, 
“selective adaptation” offers potential to strengthen understanding of China’s compliance with 
international standards in the human right to health. Under China’s state-centric discourse on 
human rights, the human right to health is one that is conferred by the state and thus subject to 
state interests and the state’s interpretation of social interest. In practice, protection of the human 
right to health in China faces significant operational challenges, as government officials give 
priority to social stability, China’s international image, and inter-bureaucratic rivalries. China’s 
health crisis does not seem to be the result of conflicts between local socio-cultural norms and 
the norms underlying international health standards. The paradigm of selective adaptation 
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suggests that questions about China’s compliance with international standards on human rights to 
health cannot be explained by reference to normative conflict or to the particularities of China’s 
socio-historical conditions. Rather, the problems seem primarily political and institutional. This 
in turn can help share local and international responses. Government commitments to greater 
transparency in reporting on infectious disease, increased government financial support for 
public access to health care, and a greater level of cooperation with international organizations 
charged with implementing human rights to health will be essential components of China’s effort 
to improve its record of compliance with international human rights standards concerning health. 
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